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Traditional weighted-average measures of trade 
distortions are widely used in analyzing global and 
regional reforms, despite well-known deficiencies. This 
paper develops and applies optimal aggregators for the 
real-world case of multiple countries and commodities 
with much more detailed information on trade than on 
production and consumption. The approach reflects the 
fact that different aggregators are needed for expenditure 
on imported goods and for tariff revenues, and allows for 
incorporation of both intensive and extensive margins 
of adjustment to reform. Applications confirm that the 
technique is straightforward enough for widespread use, 
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and point to close to a doubling of the welfare gains at 
the intensive margin when using the highest possible 
level of international commodity disaggregation, with 
larger gains in developing regions than in the industrial 
countries. The measured income gains increase along the 
entire path of liberalization, with slightly larger increases 
in the earlier stages, where the gaps between the responses 
of the expenditure and tariff revenue aggregators are 
largest. Sensitivity analysis suggests that, for global trade 
reform, the ease of substitution between tariff lines is 
much more important than that between varieties from 
different countries.Measuring the Impacts of Global Trade Reform with 
Optimal Aggregators of Distortions 
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Measuring the Impacts of Global Trade Reform with 
Optimal Aggregators of Distortions 
 
Economists have long been aware that the standard approaches used to assess the implications of 
large-scale reforms, such as WTO agreements, may seriously understate their benefits because of 
excessive aggregation of trade distortions. The problem is potentially very important because 
border protection rates applied to finely differentiated products frequently differ greatly.
1 It has 
proved difficult to resolve because the needed information on production and demand structures is 
typically available only at a much higher level of aggregation than the information on tariffs and 
trade flows and theoretically-consistent approaches to aggregation have not been available. 
Historically, measures such as simple or trade-weighted average tariffs have frequently been 
employed to summarize trade policy distortions up to a level consistent with that used for analysis 
of production and consumption. As emphasized by Anderson and Neary (1996), these measures are 
without theoretical foundation and may introduce significant  biases. The most obvious problem 
with the trade weighted average is that the weight on any tariff declines as it rises, with very high 
tariffs having vanishingly small weights even when their trade-distorting impacts may be large. As 
we show in this paper, these standard tariff aggregators have another fundamental problem in 
failing to take into account the tariff-revenue-enhancing effects of within-group increases in import 
quantities associated with tariff cuts on highly-protected goods. The first problem is clearly serious 
when liberalization reduces tariffs substantially from their initial level. The second problem is most 
serious in the initial stages of liberalization, when tariffs are at their highest. 
In recent years, new and theoretically-consistent approaches to the aggregation problem have 
emerged. Anderson and Neary (1994) proposed a uniform tariff that yields the same welfare as the 
original differentiated tariff structure. In subsequent work (2003), they developed uniform tariff 
measures that are optimal for measuring effects on trade volumes. The unifying feature of these 
aggregators is that they return the uniform tariff rates that are optimal in the sense of yielding the 
same value of a specific objective function as the actual, non-uniform, trade distortions. 
                                                 
1Anderson (2009) notes that the problem may also arise for other policy measures such as income taxes in industrial 
countries because the effects of these taxes are finely differentiated once specific exceptions are taken into account. 3 
 
Building on the Anderson-Neary approach, Bach et al. (1996) and Bach and Martin (2001) 
proposed an approach to aggregation in the context of structural economic models that mitigates 
many  of  the  problems  resulting  from  use  of  atheoretic  aggregators—and  showed  that  the 
implications of aggregation could be large for specific countries. However, they were only able to 
apply  their  approach  to  individual  countries  or  regions.  Martin  et al.  (2003)  applied  this 
methodology  to  additional  countries  and  confirmed  that  the  impact  on  the  results  could  be 
substantial. Manole and Martin (2005) developed the approach further, showing that it should be 
applied in specific ways, and establishing relationships between different tariff indexes. Anderson 
(2009) made an important step forward in identifying an approach that enables optimal aggregators 
to be used in multi-country and global models. 
Anderson (2009) showed that an optimal approach to aggregation dramatically increased the 
measured welfare benefits of trade reform relative to results obtained with a two-sector model in a 
highly  protected  country  (pre-reform  India).  A  key  question  that  remains  is  how  large  this 
aggregation bias might be in models of the type usually used to analyze global trade reforms, where 
perhaps 20 or 25 sectors are separately identified. A second key question is what parameter 
estimates are needed to implement it and to which of these parameters are the results most likely to 
be sensitive. A third question is for which types of policy reform this approach is most likely to 
make  a  difference.  Are,  in  particular,  its  impacts  greatest  for  partial  reform  or  for  full 
liberalization? A final question that we address is how extensive-margin adjustments involving 
new products or varieties might be included, and how important the intensive-margin adjustment 
on which we focus in our quantitative analysis might be relative to approaches that add adjustments 
to the range of products traded (see Debaere and Mostashari 2010). 
In Section 1, we outline the approach to aggregation used in this paper, taking particular care to 
provide  an  accessible  formulation  for  use  in  applied  models.  In  Section  2,  we  consider  the 
qualitative implications of using such an approach to aggregation taking into account the impacts 
on both the appropriate product weights and on tariff revenues. In Section 3, we focus on the 
challenges involved in applying this procedure in a global model. In Section 4, we apply our 
procedures to estimation of the needed tariff aggregates, and then to experiments involving partial 
and complete trade liberalization. Section 5 presents sensitivity analysis for the key parameters 
involved in the analysis. The conclusions of the study are presented in Section 6. 4 
 
1.  The Aggregation Approach 
An important lesson from the papers by Anderson and Neary on tariff index theory is that such 
indexes should be based on a model that relates the index to an economic objective. In this paper, 
our ultimate focus is on economic welfare, although we are interested in variables such as prices 
and trade volumes, partly for their own sake, and partly because they influence countries‘ welfare 
through terms of trade effects. Like Bach and Martin (2001), we assume that the structure of such a 
competitive, small open economy can be captured by the income-expenditure condition: 
 
  e(p,u)r(p,v)(eprp)'(ppw)f = 0  (1) 
 
and the set of behavioral equations
2, 
 
  ep(p,u)rp(p,v) = m  (2) 
 
where e(p,u) is the expenditure function of the representative household; p is a vector of 
domestic prices; p
w is the corresponding vector of exogenous external prices; u is domestic utility; 
r(p,v) is domestic revenue from production; v is a vector of productive resources; m is the vector of 
imports,  and  f  is  an  exogenously-determined  net  financial  inflow  from  abroad.  Given  this 
representation of the economy, we can define a balance-of-trade function, which captures the 
financial inflow necessary to keep utility u constant when domestic prices p change (Anderson and 
Neary (1996)) and provides a money measure of welfare changes in a small open economy. 
Based on equation 1 but taking the level of utility u0 as exogenous, B can be written as: 
 
  B(p,u0) = e(p,u0) r(p,v)(eprp)'(ppw)f = 0  (3) 
 
Many papers (such as Anderson and Neary 2006) that use the balance-of-trade function to 
capture, for instance, the trade-restricting impact of distortions use a very simple model to estimate 
a single aggregator such as the Trade Restrictiveness Index. Here, by contrast, we want to be able 
                                                 
2We use bold letters for vectors. 5 
 
to use a two-stage modeling approach that allows us to bring in information—such as information 
on the structure of production and domestic demand—that is economically important, but available 
only at a much higher level of aggregation than data on trade and trade distortions. In this way we 
can  combine  detailed  information  on  trade  distortions  with  the  information  in  many  more 
aggregated structural models such as econometrically estimated models of the type popularized by 
Kohli (2004); or with econometric (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1992) or calibrated (Hertel 1997) 
general equilibrium models.  
The potential importance of such aggregation is clear when we recall that models of the type 
developed by Kohli have only a few sectors, and global computable general equilibrium models are 
typically solved with around 20 to 25 sectors. With four sectors in an estimated structural model of 
the type used by Kohli, there would be over 1300 traded goods per sector when using data on tariffs 
and trade at the highest degree of disaggregation available internationally—the six-digit level of 
the harmonized system. Even with 25 sectors, there are over 200 traded goods per sector, and tariffs 
frequently vary greatly within these sectors. 
In the first stage of our analysis we compute indices that capture the information about tariffs 
within sectors. In the second stage, we use these indices to solve a more aggregated model. Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980) provide the theoretical underpinnings for this type of two-stage modeling. 
If the utility function is weakly separable, then the consumer‘s maximization problem can be 
decomposed into the maximization of sub-utility functions over categories of products, and at a 
higher  level,  maximization  of  total  utility  over  the  sub-utility  functions.  If  another 
condition—homotheticity of preferences at the lower level—is satisfied, then two stage-budgeting 
based can be used, with decisions at a higher level of aggregation based on aggregate prices and 
quantities passed up from the lower level. In a similar fashion, Chambers (1988) and Lloyd (1994) 
show that weak separability of the production function and homotheticity of the sub-aggregator 
functions  allow  two-stage  decision-making  approaches  to  be  used  to  represent  production 
technologies. 
In the rest of the paper we assume that the conditions needed for the formation of sub-aggregate 
price and quantity indexes have been met. These assumptions are inherent in use of any aggregates, 
such as trade-weighted averages, and are not an additional requirement of our approach relative to 
use of traditional aggregators.  6 
 
We further assume, following Armington (1969), that domestic products are differentiated 
from  imported  products  for  any  given  composite  good,  such  as  ―crops‖.  If  the  prices  of 
domestically-produced goods are determined by returns on export markets, then r(p,v) will be 
invariant  to  changes  in  tariffs,  and  import  demand  will  equal  ep(p-pw),  allowing  further 
simplification of the model. It is useful to follow standard practice in the computable general 
equilibrium modeling tradition, and to assume separability between domestic and imported goods. 
If  this  is  not  done,  the  tariff  revenue  function  may  be  non-monotonic  in  the  tariff  revenue 
aggregator with two values of the tariff aggregator—one on each side of the peak of the Laffer 
Curve—being consistent with any given tariff revenue
3. In the following section, we develop 
aggregators  for  the  two  components  of  the  model —the  expenditure  and  tariff  revenue 
functions—needed to capture the welfare impacts of tariffs in a small, open economy. 
1.1  The tariff aggregator for expenditure 
Based on the assumptions discussed above, we can define an expenditure function consistent with 
each  of  the  sub-utility  functions  used  in  the  analysis.  If  ei  is  the  expenditure  function  for 
commodity group i, then:  
  ei=ei(pi,ui0)  (4) 
 
where pi is the vector of domestic prices for goods in set i and ui0 is the initial utility level 
associated with consumption of goods in this set. Like Bach and Martin (2001), we define the tariff 
aggregator for expenditure on commodity group i as the uniform tariff, τie, which, to maintain 
sub-utility level ui0, requires the same level of expenditure on imported commodities in the group 
as the observed vector of commodity-specific tariffs. At any given utility level, this aggregator is 
optimal for measuring the impact of the tariff on domestic prices given any vector of world prices, 
and hence for the quantity of imports demanded, and the terms of trade in a multi-country model. 
Since we are assuming homotheticity of the aggregator function, ei=pi.ui where pi is the price of the 
composite good, and ui is the volume of its consumption aggregated at domestic prices. 
   
                                                 
3 Since protection levels are generally determined primarily by political-economy pressures, rather than by tariff 
revenue goals, this ambiguity cannot be resolved by choosing the tariff rate to the left of the peak of the tariff revenue 
curve. 7 
 
We can define the tariff aggregator for expenditure on commodity group i as the uniform tariff 
τie: 
  τie=[τie|ei(piw(1+τie), ui0)=ei(pi, ui0)]  (5) 
Since the commodity aggregators that we use are defined only over traded goods, we can use 
the homogeneity of degree one of the expenditure function to solve for τie, obtaining:  
  τie=ei(pi, ui0)/ei(piw, ui0) -1.   (6) 
1.2  The tariff revenue aggregator 
Bach and Martin (2001) propose a tariff revenue aggregator defined in a similar fashion to the 
expenditure aggregator. A tariff revenue aggregator for commodity group i may be defined as the 
uniform tariff that will yield the same tariff revenue as the observed vector of disaggregated tariffs 
for that particular group of commodities, conditional on the utility level underlying the expenditure 
function: 
 
  iR=[iR|tri(piw(1+iR), ui0)=tri(pi, piw, ui0)]  (7) 
 
Manole and Martin (2005) focused on identifying a closed-form solution for this aggregator. 
Anderson (2009) uses a simpler approach that we follow here, of calculating a trade-weighted 
average with endogenous quantity weights optimally chosen by the importer at each set of tariffs. 
At the initial tariff, this weighted average is the same as the conventional fixed-weight average. As 
tariffs change, the weights in the tariff revenue aggregator are updated using the specified import 
demand functions, and the two averages diverge. When multiplied by the value of imports at 
external prices, this weighted average, τi
R, returns the correct value of tariff revenues for any given 
vector of tariff rates.  
1.3  Global model solution 
In  a single-country, small-open-economy model, the tariff  aggregator for expenditure can be 
introduced into the expenditure function, and the tariff revenue aggregator into the tariff revenue 
equation, and the model used to solve for the welfare impacts of changes in tariffs. When this is 
implemented in a global model, however, a major difficulty arises because Walras‘ Law is not 
satisfied at the global level. When, for instance, a reduction in a particularly high tariff in one 8 
 
country  results  in  a  more  rapid  decline  in  expenditures  than  in  tariff  revenues,  the  country 
experiences a gain in real income without there being any corresponding increase in the value of 
production to meet the resulting increase in demand. 
This problem can be solved, following Anderson (2009), by recognizing that quantity indexes 
at  domestic prices are  different  from  quantity  indexes  at  world  prices. Since expenditure on 
aggregate good i at domestic prices must equal expenditure on the good at border prices plus tariff 
revenue:  
 
  ui(1+ie)pw=xi(1+iR)pw  (8) 
and hence  
 
  ui=xi(1+iR)/(1+ie)  (9) 
 
where ui is the quantity of aggregate i consumed in the country (defined over domestic prices); xi* 
is the quantity aggregate (at world prices) exported from the rest of the world to the country of 
interest; and all other terms are as previously defined. 
2.  Qualitative Implications of Aggregation 
Simple theory can tell us a good deal about the likely differences between the results obtained 
using traditional fixed-weight and optimal aggregators. To see this, it is useful to consider the very 
simple case when only one product is subject to a tariff. For simplicity, and without loss of 
generality, we set all international prices to unity, so that the domestic price of the product subject 
to the tariff is given by (1+t). For this case, Figure 1 shows the marginal impacts of tariff changes 
on the expenditure and tariff revenue functions that determine welfare outcomes through equation 
(2).  
To intepret Figure 1, it is useful to begin at the point t0, x0, which corresponds to the initial tariff, 
t0, and the initial quantity of imports, x0. The marginal impact of a small reduction in the tariff from 
t0 on expenditure is x0. Moves upwards and to the left from this point along the sloping solid line 
labelled x correspond to reductions in the tariff and increases in the quantity of the tariff-distorted 
good imported. When the tariff reaches zero, the weight on this good reaches x1 under the optimal 9 
 
expenditure aggregator. By contrast, with the standard fixed-weight aggregator, the weight on this 
good stays constant at x0 along the path to liberalization.  
The marginal impact of a tariff decline on tariff revenues is given by the curve labelled x+t.epp. 
As  drawn,  this  is  initially  negative—implying  an  increase  in  tariff  revenues  as  the  tariff  is 
reduced—because we start from a point beyond the peak revenues for this tariff
4. As the tariff 
reduction proceeds, the incremental increases in tariff revenues  decline, and turn into revenue 
declines where the dashed line crosses the horizontal axis. After the dashed line crosses the 
horizontal line corresponding to the initial level of imports,  x0, the tariff revenenue aggregator 
shows a larger reduction in tariff revenues than the fixed-weight index, despite allowing for the 
increases in import volumes associated with tariff declines. The marginal decline in tariff revenues 
remains below the decline in required expenditure until the tariff reaches zero, at which point, 




                                                 
4 Given the protectionist motivation of much protection, the relatively high estimated values of the elasticity of 
substitution between products at fine levels, and the high and widely-dispersed patterns of tariff rates frequently 




The tariff revenue effect reduces the decline in tariff revenues for any positive tariff, leaving a net 
gain from allowing for substitution of area abx1 in the case of full liberalization. Note that this net 
gain from incorporating the impact of quantity responses on economic welfare is front-end-loaded, 
generating larger measured gains for initial liberalization than for the same tariff reductions in the 
later stages of reform, where tariffs are relatively low. The increase in the weight in the expenditure 
index does not affect the measured welfare benefits within the group because it raises both required 
expenditure and tariff revenues to the same degree. However, it raises the measured level of the 
tariff aggregator for this sector at the composite good level, and hence the measured welfare impact 
of reform. By contrast with the tariff-revenue effect, the weighting effect is likely to be much more 
important in the later stages of the reform, when the volume of imports has increased.  
 
3.  Implementation 
We use a two-tier strategy to implement this approach in the World Bank‘s  LINKAGE global 
computable general equilibrium model (van der Mensbrugghe 2005) that has been widely used for 
analysis of major policy reforms. Our first step was to modify the structure of the model to 
-Δ Exp, 











Figure 1 Marginal impacts of tariff reductions on expenditure and tariff revenues. 11 
 
distinguish between the aggregates at domestic and world prices identified in equations (8) and (9). 
We  then  calculated  the  tariff  aggregators  for  expenditure  and  tariff  revenues  using  the 
MacMapHS6 v2.1 database (Boumellassa, Laborde and Mitaritonna, 2009) that provides detailed 
information on bilateral tariffs and trade flows at the HS6 level. Finally, we performed a series of 
simulation experiments.  
3.1  The aggregation procedure 
For concreteness, we first present a simple illustration based on a one level aggregation problem 
where HS6 products are aggregated to the sectoral aggregation of the model. Then, we introduce 
real-world problems such as those arising from differences in the rates of protection applied on 
goods from different sources; where and where the model for an importing region is an aggregate 
of different countries. We focus first on the formation of aggregates for a single good, using data at 
the six-digit product level
5. 
3.1.1  The expenditure aggregator 
We first illustrate our approach in the simple case where one country imports goods from only one 
partner, the rest of the world. The Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form is an appealing 
choice for several reasons: (i) its simplicity and parsimony, (ii) the availability of some relevant 
parameter  estimates;  and  (iii)  the  ability  to  handle  situations  where  the  number  of  firms  or 
commodities is endogenously determined (Feenstra 1994; Zhai 2008). Using a CES aggregator for 
products j being aggregated in group i, the price index for composite imported good i at domestic 
prices is (omitting the i index) given by: 
  p =(jj(pj
w(1+tj))1) 1/1         (10) 
where tj is the ad valorem tariff at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System.  
Since our focus in this paper is primarily on aggregation of existing products, the αj coefficients 
can be inferred using standard calibration procedures (Mansur and Whalley 1984). Given these 
values, the value of τ
e can be identified using  
   p =(jj(pj
w(1+tj))1) 1/(1 = (1+ τ
e).(jj(pj
w)1) 1/(1         (11) 
   
                                                 
5 Our usage differs slightly from Broda and Weinstein‘s (2003, p548) distinction between goods at the tariff-line level 
and varieties supplied by individual countries because we need to distinguish between composite goods, six-digit 
products, and six-digit varieties.  12 
 
Which defines τ





w)1) 1/(1 - 1         (12) 
 
If we follow the usual convention in calibration of choosing units so that domestic prices equal 
unity, the αj‘s are given by the initial value shares at domestic prices and the initial value of  
 τ
e = (jj(1+tj)) 1/( - 1 
3.1.2  Base case: The tariff revenue aggregator 
As noted above, our tariff revenue aggregator is a trade-weighted index, but differs from the 
standard trade-weighted index in being calculated using trade weights that adjust in response to 
changes in tariff rates.  
     τ
R = Σi ti.pi
w.qi
 / Σk pk
w.qk
        (13) 
where  qi=αi(pi/p)
-σ.u  and,  in  contrast  with  the  corresponding  weight  in  a  traditional 
trade-weighted-average,  the  value  of  qi  adjusts  as  tariff  rates  change.  τ
R  is  computed  in  an 
aggregation module independent of the global model prior to its inclusion in the global model.  
3.1.3  Practical considerations 
While the theoretical discussion above considers only aggregation from the finely disaggregated 
product level up to the composite goods used in a large-scale model, we need to take into account 
two other levels of aggregation in applied modeling. The first of these arises from the practical 
problem that some regions in most global models will be aggregates covering more than one 
economy. A second is the fact that the six-digit products considered above are likely to include 
varieties supplied by different countries. We deal with this by using three different levels of nesting 
in the model.  
At the highest level of aggregation, in cases where we have multiple importing countries in an 
importing region, we assume CES preferences across importing countries with an elasticity of 
substitution σ0. At the second level of aggregation, we assume CES preferences over the HS6 
products within the composite goods appearing in the version of the model that we use. At this 
stage, our HS6 products are aggregates over varieties imported from all supplying regions. At this 
level, we use the procedures identified in section (3.1) for the expenditure and tariff revenue 
aggregators,  with  elasticity  of  substitution  σ1.  At  the  third  level,  we  follow  the  Armington 13 
 
approach, assuming CES preferences across the six-digit varieties from different exporters. At this 
stage, we use an elasticity of substitution, σ2 between the products provided by different suppliers.  
3.2  Parameters 
Given the approach to implementation that we have chosen, we need values of three different 
elasticities of substitution 0, 1 and 2: 
  0 is assumed to be equal to 1. We choose this value to hold constant each importer’s share 
in the value of imports, primarily for want of better information; 
  1 is determined by the elasticity of substitution between imported six-digit products from 
all  sources  within  a  composite  good—such  as  between  apples  and  oranges  within  a 
composite of vegetables and fruits; 
  2  is  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  varieties  of  six-digit  products  supplied  by 
different countries/regions.  
Assuming  small  trade  shares  for  each  product,  which  seems  a  generally  reasonable 
approximation  given  that  we  have  over  five  thousand  commodities  at  the  HS6  level,  these 
elasticities of substitution seem likely to be very close to the elasticities of demand within the 
group. This allows us to draw on a number of relevant sets of parameter estimates in the literature. 
Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) provide estimates import demand elasticities at the six digit level, 
which average -3.12 for all HS products. These differ from the σ1 elasticities that we seek in 
including substitution between domestic and imported varieties of the same six-digit product. 
Thus, if we were considering a fruit composite, we would include only substitution between 
imported apples, oranges and pears, while the Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga elasticities would allow 
substitution  between  domestic  and  imported  varieties  of  each  product.  The  exclusion  of 
apples-to-apples comparisons suggests that our elasticities of substitution might be lower than the 
average for Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga. However, the high level of disaggregation at which we 
work suggests that our elasticities of substitution should not be too much lower than the Kee, Nicita 
and Olarreaga estimates. 
Some other indirect evidence on the elasticities of interest is provided by Hummels and 
Klenow (2005, p712), drawing on Hummels (2001). They consider elasticities of substitution 
between  varieties  that  are  differentiated  by  HS  six-digit  product  and  by  country  of  origin, 
concluding that these elasticities generally lie between five and ten. To the extent that these 14 
 
elasticities reflect the margins of substitution associated with both σ1 and σ2, we might expect them 
to be greater than our σ1 elasticities of substitution but less than our desired estimates for σ2. Broda 
and Weinstein (2006, p548) define varieties as goods produced by different countries, so that their 
elasticities of substitution are comparable to our σ2 measures. They find (2006, p568), that the 
elasticity  rises  sharply  as  the  categories  considered  become  more  finely  distinguished,  and 
estimated an average elasticity of substitution for products at the SITC-5 level (a slightly coarser 
level than HS6) of 13.1 as against 4.0 at the SITC-3 level.  
In our core scenario, we use σ1=2, but also consider alternative values in a sensitivity 
analysis. For σ2, we use 10 in our base case, and also perform sensitivity analysis. 
4.  Applications to Global Trade Reform 
Two key questions are addressed in this study. The first is the broad magnitude of the difference 
resulting from moving from fixed-weight to optimal aggregators in practical applications. The 
second is the extent to which these gains are larger in the initial and the later stages of reform: To 
investigate these hypotheses, we consider two experiments 
  Complete global tariff liberalization; 
  A partial liberalization scenario focused on cutting the highest tariffs most sharply. In 
particular, we use a Swiss formula (Francois and Martin 2003) to cut applied tariff rates, 
with country-specific coefficients computed to deliver a cut of 10% percent in the initial 
trade weighted tariff for each country. 
In the early stages of liberalization, the expenditure aggregator is most similar to the traditional 
fixed-weight aggregators but—as we have seen—the differences between the expenditure and the 
tariff  aggregators  are  likely  to  be  at  their  largest.  As  liberalization  proceeds,  the  differences 
between the expenditure and the tariff revenue aggregators decline. Our first experiment covers the 
complete path of liberalization. The second uses a formula that leaves large gaps between the 
expenditure and tariff-revenue aggregators by cutting only 10 percent on average, and by focusing 
its cuts on the highest tariffs.  
To implement these simulations, we first calculate the Expenditure Aggregator Tariff (τ
e) 
for each sector used in the model, and the initial trade weighted average tariff. Because the shares 
used to weight the trade-weighted-average decline with the height of the tariff on any particular 15 
 
good, we would expect the initial trade-weighted average tariff—which corresponds to τ
R in the 
initial equilibrium—to be lower than τ
e in cases where there is considerable variance in the tariffs 
within the group. Where there are some high and some low tariffs within the group, the weighted 
average tariff will place a low weight on the high tariffs. In the calculation of the hypothetical 
uniform tariff that would be equivalent in its effects on expenditure as the observed set of tariffs, 
the weight on these products increases. Examples of these estimates are presented in Table 1 for 
five countries of interest. 16 
 
Table 1 Tariff aggregators—Tariff Revenue and Expenditure Aggregators 












  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Beverages and Tobacco  32.5  32.5  14.5  25.5  91.6  119.3  13.2  16.1  5.2  10.0 
Capital Goods  15.9  17.0  1.7  1.9  9.8  10.2  0.7  0.8  2.2  2.5 
Chemicals rubber and plastics  12.2  13.0  1.1  1.2  13.3  13.6  1.0  1.0  1.5  1.7 
Fossil fuels  26.9  27.4  0.2  0.2  11.9  12.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
Other grains  5.2  5.3  25.5  39.9  39.3  51.5  34.4  43.5  0.1  0.1 
Iron and steel  10.2  11.0  0.2  0.3  16.0  16.3  0.5  0.5  0.1  0.1 
Leather  20.3  22.1  4.0  4.4  12.4  12.6  9.2  9.9  8.4  9.0 
Livestock  15.0  15.6  2.3  3.0  15.2  15.8  6.1  8.4  0.2  0.2 
Dairy products  32.3  32.3  55.9  99.5  33.8  35.1  40.6  63.0  30.9  35.1 
Motor vehicles and parts  17.7  18.1  4.1  4.4  19.4  22.4  0.0  0.0  1.0  1.0 
Other crops  25.7  26.4  5.9  31.9  36.8  45.3  2.5  12.7  12.2  19.3 
Other food  14.9  16.7  10.5  13.7  36.3  42.5  8.6  10.4  3.7  4.6 
Other manufacturing  20.4  21.3  0.9  0.9  14.9  15.0  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.7 
Other natural resources  11.0  11.8  0.3  0.4  13.3  13.6  1.2  1.3  0.0  0.1 
Oil seeds  7.9  8.0  0.2  0.2  44.6  48.1  0.1  0.1  2.0  4.7 
Plant-based fibers  0.5  0.6  0.0  0.0  12.2  12.4  0.0  0.0  7.7  8.7 
Processed meats  18.8  20.2  51.0  77.3  33.4  35.6  46.9  66.2  6.4  8.1 
Rice  21.9  22.0  93.9  110.8  71.2  73.1  427.3  551.3  2.9  3.1 
Sugar  27.5  27.7  105.3  186.7  84.1  90.0  160.2  242.2  24.5  76.5 
Services  22.5  22.5  0.0  0.0  15.0  15.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Textiles  26.7  27.3  3.5  4.1  15.5  15.9  4.3  4.9  7.0  7.6 
Vegetables and fruits  14.0  14.8  8.9  17.3  33.6  35.9  5.0  7.1  0.8  1.0 
Vegetable oils and fats  20.6  21.0  4.1  6.1  75.8  80.4  5.1  5.7  2.0  2.2 
Wearing apparel  30.3  30.4  3.5  4.1  11.7  12.5  9.8  9.9  5.4  6.1 
Simple Average over sectors  18.8  19.4  16.6  26.4  31.7  35.2  32.4  44.0  5.2  8.5 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on MAcMapHS6v2.1  
The entries in Table 1 highlight some important points. The first is that the τ
e is weakly above the 
initial weighted-average tariff, τ
R, but can be substantially above its level. The final row of the 
table, which presents the simple average of the aggregates presented above, shows that the margin 
of difference between the two measures is particularly large for high-income economies such as the 17 
 
EU and the USA, where the average tariff is low, but the dispersion of tariffs within groups is 
typically much higher (relative to the mean) than in developing countries. 
Welfare results obtained using our base-case elasticities are presented in Table 2 for full 
liberalization. For each indicator-- real income, the terms of trade and export volume--we display 
the relative changes compared to baseline with two alternative aggregators: a first column shows 
the results obtained using a standard version of the model with conventional weighted-average 
tariffs, and a second column shows the results obtained using the optimal aggregation approach 
with an assumed elasticity of substitution between tariff lines of σ1=2.0 and of σ2=10 between 
origins. 18 
 
Table 2 Results for Full Liberalization. Central case. Changes compared to baseline. 
  Real income (%)  Terms of trade (%)  Export Volume (%) 















World total  0.50  0.88  0.00  0.00  7.1  8.3 
Low and middle income 
countries 
0.58  1.30  -0.28  -0.08  14.8  16.6 
Bangladesh  -1.44  -1.03  -2.26  -2.12  56.6  61.2 
Brazil  1.39  3.18  1.01  2.52  16.0  17.5 
Chile  0.30  0.06  0.13  -0.08  0.1  -0.3 
China  -0.06  0.17  0.07  0.42  14.7  16.2 
Egypt  0.24  5.01  -0.76  -0.27  14.8  21.5 
India  0.60  1.24  -0.52  -0.28  46.9  51.3 
Indonesia  0.49  0.69  0.19  0.18  11.3  12.4 
Pakistan  0.34  -0.34  0.41  -0.49  36.8  39.0 
Thailand  2.48  3.49  0.02  0.09  17.1  18.7 
Mexico  -0.02  0.35  -0.61  -0.55  7.8  8.8 
Nigeria  4.68  6.30  -1.95  -1.96  14.1  14.3 
Turkey  1.03  2.21  0.22  0.76  9.3  13.8 
Rest of Asia  3.40  4.68  -0.67  -0.63  14.4  15.0 
Rest of LAC  0.38  0.44  -0.16  -0.18  18.2  19.3 
Morocco & Tunisia  2.77  5.82  -2.90  -1.79  60.1  67.2 
SACU  0.96  2.25  0.04  0.00  14.5  19.0 
R. of Sub Saharan Africa  -0.44  -0.55  -1.75  -2.13  23.8  23.7 
Rest of the World  0.45  1.54  -0.62  -0.72  9.2  11.4 
High income countries  0.48  0.76  0.08  0.02  3.9  4.9 
Australia & New Zealand  0.46  0.59  0.37  0.40  9.0  9.9 
Rest of Europe  1.53  3.56  0.42  0.88  4.7  7.3 
EU 27  0.44  0.96  -0.04  -0.18  2.1  3.1 
United States  0.10  0.13  0.05  0.03  6.1  6.9 
Canada  0.05  0.24  -0.30  -0.30  3.0  4.1 
Japan  0.94  0.94  0.35  0.34  6.4  7.4 
Korea & Taiwan, China  2.99  3.95  0.27  0.14  11.9  14.1 
H. Kong & Singapore  1.12  1.28  1.10  1.22  -1.5  -1.8 
Source: Authors’ computation. LINKAGE Model. 
 
In  Table  2,  the  average  increase  in  the  estimated  welfare  impacts  of  global  trade 
liberalization is 76 percent at the global level, with the estimated income gains from reform rising 
from  0.5  percent  of  initial  GDP  to  0.88  percent.  This  suggests  that  the  use  of  appropriate 
aggregation techniques is likely to be very important in real-world analysis of trade reforms. 
However, the effect of using optimal aggregation techniques varies a great deal from one country 
or region to another. The gains are much larger for developing countries than for the industrial 
countries. For the industrial countries, the average increase in the measured welfare impact is just 19 
 
under 60 percent while, for developing countries as a group, where initial rates of protection are 
higher, the corresponding gain is 124 percent. For developing countries as a group, the overall 
terms-of-trade improves by around 0.2 percent of GDP, but most of their gain (the remaining 0.52 
percent  of  GDP)  arises  from  increases  in  measured  economic  efficiency.  For  the  industrial 
countries as a group, the income gain arising from terms-of-trade improvements is smaller when 
measured using optimal aggregators, with all of the increase in welfare coming from increases in 
the measured efficiency gains from reform. 
The increase in the estimated gains is particularly large in countries/regions such as Brazil 
and Egypt. These countries gain both from improvements in efficiency when their own relatively 
high and variable tariffs are reduced, and from improvements in market access as trade barriers that 
they  face  are  reduced.  China‘s  estimated  gains  rise  because  of  increases  in  the  estimated 
terms-of-trade gains. The estimated gains actually decline for Chile, whose very uniform tariff 
structure means there are few additional measured welfare gains from improvements in efficiency, 
and  which  faces  little  tariff  heterogeneity  in  major  export  markets  because  if  its  free  trade 
agreements, and greater competition as tariffs, and their heterogeneity, on competing suppliers are 
eliminated.  
Table 3 compares the results for the Swiss Formula, which reduces the highest tariffs by the 
most, and hence reduces the dispersion of tariffs, with the results for full global liberalization. As 
expected, the welfare gains from this initial liberalization—which reduces weighted average tariffs 
by one-tenth of their initial values— are much more than one-tenth of the welfare gains from full 
liberalization. In the base case, using trade weighted average tariff cuts, the gains are a little less 
than a fifth those for full trade reform. For our analysis, the key question is whether these gains are 
relatively larger with the optimal aggregator technique than with the trade-weighted average. From 
our results, it appears that the increase in welfare gains from moving to the optimal aggregators are 
somewhat larger than in the case of full liberalization. However, the differences are not large. For 
the world as a whole, the measured welfare gains are 75 percent higher for full liberalization, and 
94 percent higher for the initial and sharply tops-down tariff cuts associated with our Swiss formula 
experiment. For developing countries, the increase in this ratio is from 2.25 to 2.33. For the 
high-income countries, the ratio increases from 1.59 to 1.79.  
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Table 3 Swiss Formula vs Full Liberalization. Real Income. Central case. Changes from 
baseline $m. 
  Swiss Formula  Full Liberalization 


















World total  0.09  0.17  1.94  0.50  0.88  1.75 
Low & middle income ctries  0.11  0.27  2.33  0.58  1.30  2.25 
Bangladesh  0.03  0.11  3.59  -1.44  -1.03  0.72 
Brazil  0.13  0.30  2.28  1.39  3.18  2.28 
Chile  0.00  -0.05  n.a.  0.30  0.06  n.a. 
China  0.01  0.08  13.92  -0.06  0.17  sign rev. 
Egypt  0.05  0.97  20.17  0.24  5.01  20.77 
India  0.20  0.31  1.59  0.60  1.24  2.05 
Indonesia  0.08  0.18  2.25  0.49  0.69  1.40 
Pakistan  0.10  0.17  1.66  0.34  -0.34  sign rev. 
Thailand  0.53  0.69  1.28  2.48  3.49  1.40 
Mexico  0.06  0.10  1.73  -0.02  0.35  sign rev. 
Nigeria  0.41  0.65  1.58  4.68  6.30  1.35 
Turkey  0.19  0.26  1.34  1.03  2.21  2.14 
Rest of Asia  0.49  0.94  1.91  3.40  4.68  1.38 
Rest of LAC  0.06  0.07  1.26  0.38  0.44  1.16 
Morocco & Tunisia  0.71  1.02  1.44  2.77  5.82  2.10 
SACU  0.19  1.92  10.20  0.96  2.25  2.34 
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  0.06  0.02  0.42  -0.44  -0.55  1.26 
Rest of the World  0.09  0.25  2.61  0.45  1.54  3.41 
High income countries  0.08  0.15  1.79  0.48  0.76  1.59 
Australia & New Zealand  0.03  0.04  1.19  0.46  0.59  1.29 
Rest of Europe  0.10  0.28  2.72  1.53  3.56  2.33 
EU 27  0.08  0.17  2.20  0.44  0.96  2.17 
United States  0.01  0.03  2.25  0.10  0.13  1.36 
Canada  0.04  0.10  2.74  0.05  0.24  4.44 
Japan  0.13  0.14  1.08  0.94  0.94  1.00 
Korea and Taiwan, China  0.78  1.32  1.69  2.99  3.95  1.32 
H.Kong *& Singapore  0.07  0.07  0.93  1.12  1.28  1.15 
Source: Authors’ computation. LINKAGE Model. 21 
 
5.  Sensitivity Analysis and Context 
Sensitivity analysis is particularly important for this paper given the exploratory nature of the 
analysis and the substantial uncertainty associated with estimates of the parameters that we use. 
While we focus on the traditional intensive margin of response, we think it also useful to put our 
results in the context of the burgeoning literature on the extensive margin of adjustment, where the 
range of products traded responds to trade policy interventions. In this section, we begin by 
examining the implications of uncertainty in key parameters for our results. We then consider the 
magnitude of our results for disaggregation at the intensive margin relative to those emerging from 
the literature on extensive margin growth.  
The two key parameters introduced in this paper are the elasticities of substitution between 
products, σ1 , and the elasticity of substitution between varieties of the same product supplied by 
different countries, σ2. Table 4 presents estimates of the gains from global trade reform for a wide 
range of different values of σ1 while estimates for σ2 are presented in Table 5. Focussing first on 
Table 4, we see that for the averages and for most coutnries, the welfare increase associated with 
liberalization increases steadily as σ1 rises. The increase is substantial in proportional terms, with 
the global welfare gains rising from 0.50 percent of GDP in the standard fixed-weight index case 
(see Table 3) to 1.17 percent with σ1=4. The gain is even larger for developing countries as a group 
than for the world as a whole. The gain for developing countries with σ1=4 is almost three times as 
high as with the fixed-weight index (1.75 vs 0.58).  
Several country exceptions to this general pattern are very informative. For Chile, the 
estimated welfare gains decline steadily as σ1 increases. As noted above, this is partly due to the 
fact that Chile has—because of its policy of a uniform tariff on all non-agricultural goods—little to 
gain from reductions in the variability of tariffs within product groups. On the export side, it suffers 
from preference erosion in major markets, such as Mercosur, the US and the EU, with which it has 
already has Free-Trade-Agreements. As the elasticity of substitution between products increases, 
third country suppliers become larger-scale competitors for Chile in markets where it has 
preferential access, resulting in declining benefits as σ1 rises. The composite Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa shows a similar pattern. For both of these exporting regions, the increase in measured 
competition in export markets is evident in deteriorations in the terms of trade shown in the right 
hand side of the table. These two cases illustrate an effect under which optimal aggregation 22 
 
increases (slightly) the importance of tariff preference erosion.  
For Bangladesh and Turkey, the benefits change very little as σ1 rises, rather than following 
the general pattern of rising substantially. In these cases there appears to be a balance of competing 
forces on the market access side, Bangladesh and Turkey benefit from preferential access to the 
European market, where it faces the same problem as Chile. Bangladesh and Turkey differ 
importantly from Chile, however, in benefitting from reform of non-preferential tariffs in major 
markets such as the United States.  
 
Table 4 Full Liberalization: Sensitivity Analysis for σ1 
 
Real Income, %  Terms of Trade, % 
 
σ1=0.5  σ1=1  σ1=2  σ1=4  σ1=0.5  σ1=1  σ1=2  σ1=4 
World total  0.67  0.73  0.88  1.17  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Low and middle income 
countries  1.00  1.07  1.30  1.75  -0.20  -0.18  -0.08  0.04 
Bangladesh  -1.03  -1.02  -1.03  -1.02  -2.08  -2.09  -2.12  -2.17 
Brazil  1.62  1.97  3.18  3.63  1.22  1.51  2.52  2.96 
Chile  0.26  0.20  0.06  -0.06  0.07  0.02  -0.08  -0.19 
China  0.01  0.05  0.17  0.76  0.16  0.22  0.42  0.64 
Egypt  1.60  2.12  5.01  8.31  -0.26  -0.26  -0.27  -0.30 
India  1.26  1.25  1.24  1.25  -0.15  -0.20  -0.28  -0.47 
Indonesia  0.56  0.56  0.69  1.37  0.18  0.16  0.18  0.71 
Pakistan  -0.50  -0.44  -0.34  -0.10  -0.48  -0.48  -0.49  -0.51 
Thailand  2.83  3.03  3.49  4.93  -0.01  0.01  0.09  0.81 
Mexico  0.24  0.27  0.35  0.51  -0.53  -0.54  -0.55  -0.58 
Nigeria  5.53  5.76  6.30  7.10  -1.99  -2.00  -1.96  -1.86 
Turkey  2.16  2.18  2.21  2.23  0.81  0.79  0.76  0.70 
Rest of Asia  4.03  4.29  4.68  6.19  -0.63  -0.61  -0.63  -0.01 
Rest of LAC  0.68  0.62  0.44  0.42  0.02  -0.03  -0.18  -0.25 
Morocco & Tunisia  4.94  5.22  5.82  6.94  -1.74  -1.76  -1.79  -1.91 
SACU  1.74  1.80  2.25  3.15  -0.09  -0.08  0.00  0.13 
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  -0.32  -0.37  -0.55  -0.79  -1.90  -1.96  -2.13  -2.42 
Rest of the World  1.19  1.30  1.54  2.03  -0.76  -0.76  -0.72  -0.61 
High income countries  0.58  0.63  0.76  1.02  0.06  0.05  0.02  -0.01 
Australia and New Zealand  0.53  0.54  0.59  0.89  0.38  0.39  0.40  0.37 
Rest of Europe  2.80  3.07  3.56  4.45  0.67  0.74  0.88  0.94 
EU 27  0.63  0.70  0.96  1.37  -0.10  -0.12  -0.18  -0.24 
United States  0.12  0.13  0.13  0.16  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.03 
Canada  0.14  0.18  0.24  0.24  -0.30  -0.31  -0.30  -0.22 
Japan  0.86  0.88  0.94  1.20  0.34  0.34  0.34  0.32 
Korea and Taiwan, China  3.22  3.56  3.95  4.99  0.27  0.22  0.14  -0.18 
Hong Kong SAR, China and 
 Singapore  1.23  1.25  1.28  1.27  1.19  1.20  1.22  1.18 
Source: Authors’ computation. LINKAGE Model. 
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Table 5 presents results on sensitivity analysis for σ2. The striking feature of these results is 
just how little impact there is from changes in the elasticitiy of substitution at this level. There are 
two main reasons for this. The first is the fact that tariff rates imposed on different suppliers of the 
same six-digit product are much less variable than the tariffs imposed on different six-digit 
products within the product categories that we use. The second is that our modeling strategy 
involves much less aggregation across regions than it does across commodities.  
While there are relatively few cases where the value of σ2 affects the results substantially, 
some of thse cases are informative. Bangladesh is one such case, where all of the additional income 
gains arise from terms-of-trade improvements. These gains are consistent with the fact that 
Bangladesh exports substantial quantities of textiles and clothing to Europe under tariff 
preferences, while exporting substantial quantities to other markets, such as the United States, over 
relatively high tariffs. When Bangladeshi producers can respond to progressively lower tariffs, the 
measured terms-of-trade gains over the path to full liberalization are greater than if the export mix 
within product groups is held constant at its initial level. Similar issues regarding preferences arise 
in the composite region for the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the terms-of-trade losses 
associated with preference erosion and rising prices of imports such as food are pared back when 
optimal aggregators are used. In this case, not all of the increase in real income is obtained from 
improvements in the term of trade. For a composite region such as this, additional welfare gains 
can be expected on the import side because of the differences in the tariffs levied by different 
members of the group. Given these differences in tariff rates, our optimal aggregator technique can 
be expected to report higher welfare gains from tariff reforms. The case of ―Rest of Asia‖ is 
particularly interesting as our aggregators result in smaller welfare gains. The reduction in the real 
income gains is exactly accounted for by deterioration in the terms of trade, driven at least in part 
by increasing import prices as the share weights on imported goods rise.  24 
 
Table 5 Full Liberalization: Sensitivity Analysis for σ2 
  Real Income, %  Terms of Trade, % 
  σ2=6  σ2=10  σ2=14    σ2=6  σ2=10  σ2=14   
World total  0.87  0.88  0.88    0.00  0.00  0.00   
Low and middle income countries  1.29  1.30  1.30    -0.08  -0.08  -0.08   
Bangladesh  -1.31  -1.03  -0.90    -2.33  -2.12  -2.01   
Brazil  3.19  3.18  3.17    2.53  2.52  2.51   
Chile  0.07  0.06  0.05    -0.08  -0.08  -0.09   
China  0.17  0.17  0.17    0.43  0.42  0.42   
Egypt  5.01  5.01  5.00    -0.26  -0.27  -0.27   
India  1.24  1.24  1.23    -0.28  -0.28  -0.29   
Indonesia  0.69  0.69  0.69    0.18  0.18  0.18   
Pakistan  -0.33  -0.34  -0.34    -0.49  -0.49  -0.49   
Thailand  3.49  3.49  3.48    0.10  0.09  0.08   
Mexico  0.34  0.35  0.36    -0.55  -0.55  -0.55   
Nigeria  6.29  6.30  6.31    -1.97  -1.96  -1.96   
Turkey  2.20  2.21  2.21    0.76  0.76  0.77   
Rest of Asia  4.93  4.68  4.55    -0.38  -0.63  -0.76   
Rest of LAC  0.39  0.44  0.48    -0.22  -0.18  -0.15   
Morocco & Tunisia  5.81  5.82  5.84    -1.78  -1.79  -1.79   
SACU  2.24  2.25  2.26    -0.01  0.00  0.01   
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  -0.63  -0.55  -0.44    -2.19  -2.13  -2.05   
Rest of the World  1.51  1.54  1.55    -0.73  -0.72  -0.71   
High income countries  0.76  0.76  0.76    0.02  0.02  0.02   
Australia and New Zealand  0.61  0.59  0.58    0.42  0.40  0.40   
Rest of Europe  3.55  3.56  3.57    0.87  0.88  0.88   
EU 27  0.95  0.96  0.95    -0.18  -0.18  -0.18   
United States  0.13  0.13  0.13    0.03  0.03  0.03   
Canada  0.24  0.24  0.24    -0.30  -0.30  -0.31   
Japan  0.92  0.94  0.94    0.34  0.34  0.35   
Korea and Taiwan, China  3.94  3.95  3.95    0.14  0.14  0.14   
Hong Kong SAR, China and 
 Singapore 
1.25  1.28  1.30    1.21  1.22  1.24   
Source: Authors’ computation. LINKAGE Model. 
 
While the aggregators that we use would allow incorporation of the impacts of changes in 
the range of products traded, our focus in this paper has been exclusively on the intensive margin of 
adjustment, where the quantities of currently-traded goods adjust to the changes in distortions. Our 
analysis allows an initial comparison of the importance of the problem of aggregation bias in global 
general equilibrium modeling relative to the problems associated with omission of the extensive 
margin of new product introduction.  
A recent econometric study by Debaere and Mostashari (2010) concludes that modest 
liberalization by an importing country appears to have very little impact on the range of products 25 
 
imported. Over the period from 1996 to 2006, they find that the share of manufactured imports into 
the United States attributable to new goods was less than 12 percent. From their econometric 
analysis, they conclude that between 5 and 12 percent of this increase in the number of traded 
goods could be explained by reductions in US tariffs. Given the high elasticities of substitution that 
appear to apply to substitution between varieties, the welfare gains associated with increasing 
variety that results from trade liberalization are likely, in this situation, to be quite small
6. Recent 
empirical work by Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) emphasizes more the expansion in the volume of new 
products, but finds this to be large only in cases where one or both of a pair of trading partners 
undergoes a major structural transformation, and to be small for modest trade liberalizat ions. 
Simulation analysis by Zhai (2008) building on the Melitz model assumptions concluded that 
allowing for increases in product variety picks up the welfare gains from own-liberalization, and 
concluded that liberalization could roughly double the welfare gains of global reform relative to 
standard approaches to trade liberalization.  
This very brief survey of the emerging literature on extensive margin implications of trade 
liberalization suggests that the question of aggregation on which we focus appears to be quite 
important relative to the impacts of extensive -margin growth in varieties. Our result that the 
welfare gains from global trade reform are likely to  roughly  double once aggregation  at the 
intensive margin is undertaken properly seems to be roughly as important as including extensive 
margin growth was in the Zhai (2008) model. For modest trade liberalization, it seems likely to be 
at least as important as the results obtained in the empirical literature on extensive margin growth 
and trade liberalization. Further, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive—our aggregators 
allow for expansion in product variety if the remaining components of the modeling framework 
can represent this phenomenon, as in Zhai (2008). 
 
6.  Conclusions 
It has always been clear that the crude trade-weighted-average approach to aggregation used in 
almost all quantitative modeling of the benefits of trade reform wastes valuable information that is 
available in the detailed data on trade and trade distortions. Despite this, many applied studies have 
                                                 
6 Feenstra (1994) shows using a Dixit-Stiglitz framework that the welfare gain when new varieties account for an x 
percent expansion of imports is (1+x)
1/(σ-1).    26 
 
continued to be based on crude aggregates of around 25 products chosen for tractability and 
consistency with production and consumption data that are generally available only at much higher 
degrees of aggregation. In this study, we use the broad approach to aggregation developed by Bach 
and Martin (2001) to deal with the problem of aggregation when protection rates vary substantially 
within the groups used in the analysis. Under this approach, we form distinct aggregates for both 
expenditure on goods, and for tariff revenues, distinguishing, following Anderson (2009), between 
quantity aggregates at domestic and international prices.  
Before applying the approach, we first consider its implications using a simple, graphical 
approach. We show that the use of optimal aggregators has two important implications. Within 
each aggregate group used, the marginal impact of a tariff reduction on expenditures will be greater 
than its marginal impact on tariff revenues, since each reduction in tariffs increases the volume of 
imports on which tariffs are collected. This difference allows us to capture true welfare gains that 
are omitted when using traditional trade-weighted averages, and which decline as liberalization 
proceeds. However, as tariffs decline, rising weights on tariffs that have experienced large tariff 
reductions increase the weights on reductions in these tariffs. This qualitative analysis raises a 
question that we address in the analysis—of whether optimal aggregators have a larger impact 
when considering complete tariff liberalization, or in the initial stages of liberalization. 
To provide an answer to the questions posed, we apply the technique, using detailed tariff 
information provided by the MAcMapHS6v2.1 database, in a modified version of the LINKAGE 
global general equilibrium model, taking into account the nested structure of import demand in that 
model.  Using  this  aggregation  procedure  with  a  conservative  estimate  of  the  elasticity  of 
substitution between six-digit tariff lines results in a substantial increase— close to a doubling—in 
the estimated welfare gains from complete liberalization of global trade barriers both for aggregate 
country groups and for most individual countries. The impact is not the same across countries, with 
some of the exceptions providing very important insights. Perhaps the most interesting exception is 
Chile,  where  the  low  variability  of  tariffs  means  conventional  aggregation  causes  little 
understatement of the welfare gains from own-liberalization, while picking up stronger adverse 
impacts from tariff preference erosion in markets subject to free trade agreements. Comparison of 
our results with the latest available estimates of the implications of allowing for extensive-margin 
growth suggests that using optimal aggregators is likely to be in the same order of magnitude of 
importance as accounting for the effects of extensive-margin growth in the range of varieties 27 
 
traded. The two approaches are, of course, not mutually exclusive and our nested Dixit-Stiglitz 
approach to representing preferences over products and varieties provides a potential basis for 
capturing the implications of changes in the range of varieties traded.  
Sensitivity  analysis  on  the  key  parameters  suggests  that  the  elasticity  of  substitution 
between six-digit products, for which there is substantial variability in protection rates, has a much 
greater influence on the welfare results than the elasticity of substitution between suppliers of 
different varieties of the same product. The strength of this result suggests that econometric work 
to obtain better estimates of the relevant elasticities should focus on substitution between tariff 
lines, rather than between suppliers. Another priority for further work appears to be extending 
models to take into account both proper aggregation across tariffs, and endogenous changes in the 
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